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This week, the European Parliament rejected the European Council’s proposals on the EU
budget for 2014-2020. While some believe this to be a victory for the Parliament in opposing
budget cuts, negotiations are still to take place until a package deal is agreed between both
institutions. Raya Kardasheva argues that while package lawmaking initially served as a
flexible tool for negotiation among a select group of senior legislators, the process has now
evolved outside institutional rules and it increasingly resembles the frantic group dance
movements of this year ’s viral YouTube meme ‘Harlem shake’.
On 13 March 2013, the European Parliament (EP) rejected the European Council’s proposals on the EU
budget (2014-2020). While some believe this to be a victory f or the Parliament in opposing budget cuts,
negotiations are still to take place until a compromise is reached. Trilogues are already scheduled to
provide the institutional setting f or negotiations between MEPs and governments while the process will be
f acilitated by the Commission. The Council and the Parliament are now starting to work towards reaching a
f inal package deal on the EU budget.
Decision-making through packages has been increasingly adopted by EU legislators. The package
legislation process involves the linkage of  multiple issues and proposals and their simultaneous decision.
The European Commission has recently proposed a number of  legislative packages including the Railway
package, Climate and energy package, Single European Sky package, Pharmaceutical package,  Financial
services package, and the Employment package. In my research on package lawmaking, I estimated that
around 25 per cent of  all EU legislation completed in the period May 1999 – April 2007 was decided through
a package deal. The study involved the analysis of  2,369 issues, 1,465 legislative proposals and 19 policy
areas. Around 72 per cent of  all package deals f ell under the co-decision procedure and around 28 per cent
took place under the consultation procedure. The results indicate that package lawmaking is pref erred
when proposals are distributive and urgent, when the chambers’ pref erence intensit ies dif f er, when the EP
party leaders are involved in negotiations, and when the policy area is def ined by multi- issue legislation.
This is certainly the case of  the 2014-2020 EU budgetary package.
Without exaggerating the ef f ect of
package deals on the EP’s legislative
inf luence, I f ound that in exchange f or
supporting Member States’ budgetary
pref erences, the Parliament secures
greater institutional powers.
Legislators exchange support in some
issues f or loss in others, thus
achieving mutual gain. Theref ore, there
are clear benef its f or each institution
in negotiating legislation in packages.
However, such inf ormal compromises
f ace the inherent problem of
enf orcement. Package deals are likely
to break if  promises are made
sequentially, across policy areas, or if
it  is unclear who represents the
Parliament or the Council in such salient and costly negotiations. With an increasing number of  legislators
involved in package deal negotiations, there is a serious issue of  ambiguity over who has a mandate to
strike a deal between the EP and the Council and to what extent the negotiated compromise is
representative of  the chambers’ interests.
As package lawmaking has gained popularity in the EU, a wider group of  legislators have become involved in
intra- and inter- institutional negotiations. The process has now evolved outside procedural rules and it
increasingly resembles the f rantic group dance movements of  this year ’s viral YouTube harlem shake meme.
The video f eatures one person dancing, who is largely ignored by everyone else in the room. When the
chorus begins, however, everyone starts dancing f rantically, of ten out of  control. Package lawmaking was
tradit ionally adopted in distributive legislation with a select group of  senior negotiators involved. However,
with the Commission proposing a number of  packages f ollowing the increase of  complex multi- issue
legislation in the EU, package lawmaking now resembles the second stage of  the ‘harlem shake’ where
legislators negotiate within and across institutions, leading to a less transparent and of ten f rantic
decision-making process.
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